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I. INTRODUCTION
The district court clearly erred when it found that real property once owned by Appellants
Lake Cascade Airpark, LLC ("Lake Cascade Airpark") and Donald and Candace Miller (the
"Millers") was valuable only as agricultural grazing land and worth no more than $4,500 per acre
or $1,501,500. 1 That is because, as shown at trial, the property is uniquely suited for
development as a wetland mitigation bank pursuant to the Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1301, et

seq., and sellable credits from the bank have great value and are marketable in southwest
Idaho-not just Valley County. While recognizing that future potential, the district court still
found a wetland mitigation bank afforded the property no additional value, ultimately finding the
proof at trial showed the property only has value as agricultural land.
In this case, after reviewing the entire record, the Court should be left with a definite and
firm conviction that a mistake has been made. Evidence presented by Respondent Northwest
Farm Credit Services ("NFCS") that a wetland mitigation bank was not feasible on the property
in 2012 was inconsistent with an earlier appraisal it prepared in 2008 to underwrite the loans.
Further, NFCS's assumptions on the developmental potential of a wetland mitigation bank were
not only contradicted at trial but unquestionably wrong. A reasonable decision maker would not
have relied on such evidence and found the property could only be valued as agricultural land.
Thus, as explained further below, the Court should reverse the district court's factual findings on
the value of the property as clearly erroneous.
1 As in their opening appeal brief, Lake Cascade Airpark and the Millers are, at times,
referred to collectively as "Appellants."
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II. REPLY ARGUMENT
A.

The District Court Committed Clear Error Finding The Property Was Valuable
Only As Agricultural Land And Worth No More Than $4,500 Per Acre Or
$1,501,500.

1.

Appellants Challenge The District Court's Finding That A Wetland
Mitigation Bank Would Add No Value To The Property, Not The
Competency OfNFCS's Evidence Or The Finding That The Development Of
A Residential Airpark Was Not Feasible.

Appellants explained in their opening brief (at pages 15-16) that key to the district court's
valuation of the subject propertl was its finding that the property "was valuable only as farm or
ranch land." Quoting R. 398. 3 On that basis, the district court found the property's reasonable
value was no more than $4,500 per acre or $1,501,500. R. 64, 398-99. NFCS argues that
competent and substantial evidence supports those findings and points to the May 2012 appraisal
of the property prepared by its employee, Susan Robbins, and her trial testimony. See
Respondent's Brief at 9-11. In particular, Respondents cite Robbins' opinion that the market for
agricultural land in Valley County for recreational and residential purposes had collapsed by
2012. Id. at 10-11. According to Robbins, land that had sold for such purposes years before was

again selling as agricultural land and at lower prices to reflect that classification. See id.

2 The real property in question is more fully described in Appellants' opening brief. See
Appellants' Brief at 3-6.

3 Appellants use the same system for record cites in this brief as they did in their opening
brief. The Clerk's Record on Appeal is cited as "R." and the transcript from the September 25,
2012 trial is cited as "Tr." The exhibits admitted at the trial are cited as "Ex." Because the trial
exhibits are compiled and numbered sequentially, the page number of the compilation is cited, as
opposed to the page number of the exhibit itself. For instance, "Ex. (H) at 37" refers to Exhibit
H and page 37 of the compilation of exhibits, not page 37 of Exhibit H.
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By this appeal, however, Appellants do not challenge the competency ofNFCS's
evidence. Nor do they challenge the district court's finding that the local real estate market did
not support the development of a residential airpark on the property's west side (adjacent to the
Cascade Airstrip). See R. 64, 398. That finding was arguably supported by the sales
comparisons used by Robbins in her 2012 appraisal and her general experience and knowledge
of the real estate market in Valley County. See generally Ex. (H). In contrast, the nature of the
evidence supporting the district court's finding that a wetland mitigation bank would add no
value to the property was far different. As explained in Appellants' opening brief (at pages 1520), that evidence was riddled with inconsistencies and unsupported and unsupportable
assumptions about the developmental potential of a wetland mitigation bank on the property and
the market for sellable credits from the bank, once established.
2.

The Court Should Be Left With A Definite And Firm Conviction That A
Future Wetland Mitigation Bank Would Add Great Value To The Property
And That The Property Should Not Have Been Valued As Only Agricultural
Grazing Land.

On that basis, Appellants submit that the district court's finding that the property is
valuable only as agricultural land-and gains no value as a wetland mitigation bank-should be
set aside as clearly erroneous. See Idaho R. Civ. P. 52(a). In other words, the Court should be
left with a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made regarding those findings.
See State v. Roe, 139 Idaho 18, 21, 72 P.3d 858, 861 (2003). The facts found must also sustain

conclusions oflaw, Kennedy v. Schneider, 151 Idaho 440, 442, 259 P.3d 586, 588 (2011), and
here they do not. NFCS responds by arguing that substantial evidence supports the district
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court's finding on the property's limited value, namely that: (1) Robbins "discarded the Subject
Property's developmental potential as a wetland mitigation bank"; (2) a wetland mitigation bank
had not been approved on the property; and (3) there was no active market for sellable mitigation
credits from a mitigation bank in Valley County. See Respondent's Brief at 11-13.
But a reasonable fact finder would not have relied on such evidence. See PacifiCorp. v.
Idaho State Tax Comm 'n, 153 Idaho 759, 768,291 P.3d 442, 451 (2012) (explaining that

evidence is substantial if reasonable trier of fact would accept it and rely on it to determine
disputed point of fact). As for Robbins, her view of the developmental potential of a wetland
mitigation bank on the property's eastern side was inconsistent, as she rendered completely
different opinions on its feasibility and value in 2008 and 2012. When Robbins appraised the
property in 2008-to underwrite the loans-she stated, "the wet land areas are considered in the
valuation of this property," Ex. (2) at 78, and found "[t]he wet land mitigation bank may have
some impact" on the east side of the property, id. at 81. Ultimately, she considered the
developmental potential of a future wetland mitigation bank, as well as an airpark on the
remaining property. See id.; see also Tr. at 65: 19-66:9. She valued the entire property at
$15,406 per acre or $5,141,040. Ex. (2) at 72,84.
In 2012, now appraising the property to support NFCS' s foreclosure of the loans,
Robbins found the property worth far less, $4,001 per acre or $1,335,000. Ex. (H) at 31. In
reaching that conclusion, Robbins took an entirely different view of a wetland mitigation bank
and concluded such a use was not feasible on the property. Id. at 27,37,39; Tr. 37:13-25,62:1319. She did so despite observing, just as she did in 2008, that the mitigation bank was not
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complete. Compare Ex. (H) at 27,37 with Ex. (2) at 78. Moreover, Appellants' work to
establish the wetland mitigation bank was, by 2012, even further along than in 2008. See Tr.
123:25-124:25 (testimony of James Fronk, explaining that between 2007 and 2009 he conducted
wetland delineation of property, prepared soil analysis, and monitored groundwater, among other
activities); Tr. 106: 17 -23 (testimony of Don Miller regarding feasibility report requested and
paid for in 2010).
Thus, given the regard Robbins gave a future wetland mitigation bank in 2008, it was
umeasonable to find a mitigation bank had no value in 2012. As even NFCS acknowledges,
James Fronk, an Army CorPs of Engineers certified wetland delineator, testified it would take
approximately one year to update the site plan, obtain govermnental approval, and develop the
wetlands, all at a cost between $50,000 and $75,000. See Respondent's Brief at 12; see also Tr.
127:24-128:21, 132:4-133:25. Indeed, Fronk testified that the mitigation bank could be
reintroduced to the Corps of Engineers and the Environmental Protection Agency using the same
data that Appellants had already developed. Tr. 126: 17-127:5. All in all, a wetland mitigation
bank could be completed well within the 12- to 24-month marketing time to sell the property
Robbins used in reaching her 2012 valuation. See Ex. (H) at 31. The fact that the mitigation
bank was not complete was simply of no import given its undisputed developmental potential
within the anticipated marketing time. 4 See generally R. 61 (finding "[i]t is undisputed that part

4 As explained in Appellants' opening brief (at pages 4-6, 11-12, 17-18), the east side of
the property was determined to be "a prime spot for a wetland bank" given its unique natural
attributes. Tr. 125:5-126:5, 127:6-17. The property is located within a large drainage close to
(continued ... )
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of the property has future potential as a source of wetland mitigation").
Finally, Robbins' most basic understandings of the workings of a wetland mitigation
bank under the Clean Water Act were unquestionably flawed. Particularly notable was Robbins'
mistaken belief that the market for sellable credits from a wetland mitigation bank on the
property was limited to Valley County and that no such market existed in Valley County. See
Tr. 53:19-54:12. NFCS continues to perpetuate that misunderstanding in its appeal brief, see,

e.g., Respondent's Brief at 13 ("More importantly ... there is no active market in Valley County
for wetland credits."), apparently based on Fronk's testimony that credits have not been bought
and sold in the Valley County drainage, id. at 12.5
Whether credits have been bought and sold in Valley County, however, has no bearing on
whether credits from a mitigation bank on the property are marketable. Once established, credits
from the bank are sold to Section 404 permittees-such as the Idaho Transportation Department
("lTD") and other developers that adversely impact aquatic resources-within distinct service
(... continued)
Cascade Reservoir and has naturally high groundwater levels and prehistoric drainages that run
to the middle of the property, allowing wetlands on the property to be self-sustaining. Id.
5 NFCS also argues that Fronk "testified that in his 20 years of experience only 100 acres
of wetlands had been developed in Valley County." Respondent's Brief at 12. That is not how
Fronk testified. When asked about his professional experience, Fronk stated:

In the past 20 years, ... I've probably delineated, per the Clean Water Act
process, probably over 200,000 acres of wetlands in the Valley, and Adams
County, and Ada County area .... I estimate I probably constructed wetlands in
the area of 100 acres that have been built and constructed.
Tr. 118:22-119:4.
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areas. 6 See 40 C.F.R. §§ 230.93(b)(2), 230.98; 33 C.F.R. §§ 332.3(b)(2), 332.8. The service
area for the planned mitigation bank on the property would include not only the Payette River
drainage but also the Boise River drainage and Weiser River drainage. Tr. 101:6-14, 134:5-12.
That area encompasses a large portion of southwest Idaho, not simply Valley County.
In any event, NFCS can point to no evidence in the record to suggest that credits from a
wetland mitigation bank on the property could not be sold in Idaho. To the contrary, Fronk
testified that an established market for the wetland credits already exists in the state. Tr. 130: 18131: 13, 134:5-16. Although fairly new, there are four existing wetland mitigation banks in
Idaho. Tr. 131:6-13. Fronk also explained that lTD recently purchased three to four acres'
worth of emergent wetlands for approximately $25,000 per tenth of an acre. Tr. 130:18-131:5.
Other evidence showed that the City of Boise recently purchased credits for $4.50 per square
foot (or approximately $180,000 per acre). See Tr. 106:17-107:20. It follows that a ready
market for credits from a wetland mitigation bank on the property already exists and that the
credits would be extremely valuable, well above $4,500 per acre (as found by the district court)
or $4,001 per acre (as found by Robbins).
In sum, the district court clearly erred when it found the property was valuable only as
agricultural land and that a future wetland mitigation bank would afford no value to the property.
No reasonable view of the evidence can lead to such findings when the evidence, as here, was

6 In fact, it was lTD, a potential customer, who first approached Lake Cascade Airpark
regarding the property and its potential as a wetland mitigation bank. Tr. 97:21-98:5; see also
Tr. 95:14-96:16; Ex. (2) at 78.

-774968370A 0043308-00005

internally inconsistent, contradicted by external evidence, and ultimately insubstantial. After
considering the entire record, the Court should be left with a definite and firm conviction that a
mistake has been made regarding the district court's valuation of the property. See Kennedy, 151
Idaho at 445-46, 259 P.3d at 591-92 (finding trial court committed clear error in finding
plaintiffs proved claim of adverse possession when court's findings were not supported by
substantial evidence).
B.

The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Refused To Amend Its Findings
And Grant A New Trial On The Reasonable Value Of The Property.

The district court also abused its discretion when it denied Appellants' motions to amend
the findings and conclusions pursuant to Idaho R. Civ. P. 52(b) and 59(e) and motion for a new
trial pursuant to Idaho R. Civ. P. 59(a)(6). In its opposition brief, NFCS supports the district
court's denial of those motions based on the fact that the court recognized its decisions were
discretionary. Respondent's Brief at 15-16. While that is true, whether a district court abuses its
discretion also turns on whether it acted within the boundaries of its discretion and reached its
decision through an exercise of reason. Lanham v. Idaho Power Co., 130 Idaho 486,497-98,
943 P.2d 912,923-24 (1997). As already explained, substantial evidence does not support the
district court's finding that the property has value only as agricultural land. Given the lack of
substantial evidence, the court did not act within the bounds of its discretion or reach its
decisions based on reason. For that reason, the district court abused its discretion in refusing to
amend its findings and conclusions and to grant a new trial.
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C.

The Prevailing Party In This Appeal Is Entitled To Costs And Attorney Fees.

NFCS does not challenge Appellants' right to costs and attorney fees on appeal, should
Appellants prevail. See Respondent's Brief at 17-19. Raising no such objection, NFCS
necessarily concedes that Appellants are entitled to recover costs pursuant to Idaho Appellate
Rule 40 and attorney fees pursuant to Idaho Code § 12-120(3) in that situation. See Appellants'
Brief at 21-22. On the other hand, should NFCS prevail, Appellants concede the two loan
agreements entitle NFCS to recover its reasonable attorney fees on appeal.
III. CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above, Appellants respectfully request the Court reverse the
district court's order finding the subject property was valuable only as agricultural land and that
the property's reasonable value was no more than $4,500 per acre or $1,501,500 and remand this
matter to the district court. Appellants also request that the Court award them costs and attorney
fees as the prevailing parties on appeal.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 25th day of November, 2013.
STOEL RIVES

LLP

W. Christophe Pooser
Attorneys for Appellants Lake Cascade
Airpark, LLC and Donald and Candace Miller
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